This paper examines the finances and the effect of credit limitations on the behavior and performance of firms in Costa Rica. The study is based on a survey applied by the authors to manufacturing firms during 2001. We characterize the profile of finances of firms, examine the determinants of firms' access to banking credit and try to assess the effect of credit constraints on the behavior and performance of firms.
Introduction
Economists are familiar with the notion that credit constraints and other credit market imperfections may severely limit the investment and operations of firms. Credit constraints limit the size of firms, as well as their growth, profits, activations and liquidations, and, possibly, their scope of operations.
Understanding the implications of credit constraints is of first order importance for the performance of aggregate economies, especially for developing economies, as capital market imperfections can therefore impair the aggregate accumulation of capital, the rate of return of investments, innovations and accumulation.
In this paper we investigate the existence, the determinants and the consequences of credit constraints for firms operating in Costa Rica. While the existence of credit market imperfections can be self-evident, in this paper we aim is to empirically examine their nature and their relevance. The paper is based on a survey that we applied to a relatively large sample of manufacturing firms operating in the Metropolitan Area of Costa Rica. We asked firms about their current finances as well as the sources of funds at the time of the initiation. With the data obtained we explore the relationship between a firm's finances with its characteristics and performance.
The paper is divided in three main sections. First, we analyze and compare the basic statistics on credit across firms with different characteristics. Second, we attempt to determine the characteristics of firms and of entrepreneurs that determine whether they have access to credit from formal financial intermediaries. Third, we also want to make progress in the difficult question of assessing the effect that having access to formal credit has on the performance of firms.
In a recent study (Monge, Cascante and Hall [32] ), we explored the institutional arrangements and banking practices present in Costa Rica for enforcing financial contracts. In that study we documented an rather sophisticated information network among lenders. We found that banks seem to actively screen and keep track of the projects they finance. Interestingly, we documented the fact that banks use the value and liquidity of the collateral posted by the entrepreneur as a key criterion to grant credit. In fact, we found that collateral plays a key role on the interaction between the creditor and the borrower, including cases of default and their resolution via civil courts. We also found that previous experience with borrowers appears also as a major determinant of the decision of banks to grant credit. In sum, the results reported in that paper suggest some of the main reasons why some entrepreneurs may not receive credit.
In this paper we focus on the information on firms instead of banks behavior. Clearly, the current paper is the natural complement to Monge et.al [32] . Now we examine the differences in the sources of funds of firms with difference characteristics. Among other things, this information can help us exmine the importance of internal vs. external finance as well as the different sources of external finance, in particular, the importance of formal (banking) vs. trade credit and informal credit for firms with different characteristics.
We concentrate on the particular question of what factors determine whether a firm has access or not to formal financial markets. It is well known that, typically, credit from formal institutions is less expensive that the credit from informal creditors or from commercial partners. With the information we gathered, we apply simple and standard econometric methods, (Probits and Tobits), aiming to determine if any of the characteristics of the firm and of the entrepreneur determine the access to banking credit. 1 We examine this question not only for the current finance of the firms but also for their report of the finances at the time they started operating.
In our survey, we also inquired firms on different measures of their performance. That information allows us to adopt econometric methods from the literature on treatment effects, trying to assess the effect of having access to bank financing on the performance and behavior of firms. Yet, we have to face a key econometric problem: The characteristics of firms that determine their performance may also determine their access to credit from banks. It can be misleading to simply run an OLS including firms with access and without access and estimate the effect of banking credit from the difference in the average on performance measure. To correct for potential selection biases, we use two methods. The first is the widely used two-step estimator developed mostly by Heckman's (e.g. Heckman [13, 14] ).
The method consist in first estimating the probability of access to credit and then to use the predicted value to correct a regression on the performance of the firm. The second method is less well-known, but its application in economics and other social sciences is growing rapidly. This is a non-parametric method, which was mostly developed by Manski (e.g. Manski [29, 30] ). The method consist on estimating the worst-case and best-case scenario of the effect of the access to banking credit on the performance of firms. The second estimator is more robust but typically less conclusive (less statistically efficient given correct functional form assumptions) than the parametric methods. With the data at hand, the results we obtained seem to indicate that having access to banking credit has indeed effects on firms behavior. It appears that the effect is stronger on young firms.
It is important to highlight the limitations of this study. Unfortunately availability on data on firms is the major limitation in Costa Rica. That is precisely why the main task for this project consisted in collecting the data. However, we can only recover a cross-sectional data base, with some retrospective questions on previous dates. Our results hing on the cross-section variation of active firms to identify the effect of credit constraints. The lack of panel data impedes applying GMM methods to test credit constraints on the investment of firms. Those methods have been discussed and applied with relative success by Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss [20] , and Schiantarelli [34] , and the other country studies in this round.
The reminder of the paper is as follows: In the next section we review the economic models of credit constraints. The following section reviews the banking credit and banking practices found in Costa Rica. The subsequent section provides the background information on the manufacturing sector in Costa Rica. Next, we describe the survey we conducted and the sample of firms. The subsequent section presents the methods used to single out the key determinants for the access to formal credit. The sixth section discusses econometric strategies to isolate the effect of credit constraints on firm performance and present the results. Section seven concludes. The appendix contains tables and figures not included in the main body.
Credit Constraints and Firm's Behavior
Early theoretical models of entrepreneurship assume directly that credit contracts for business start-ups and ongoing financing are very much limited. For example, in the model of Bernhardt and Lloyd-Ellis [6] , there are no credit possibilities at all. In their economy, the operation and formation of firms has to be funded by accumulated entrepreneur's savings and firm's past profitability. In other models, the maximum credit agents can get to fund their productive ventures is modeled as a direct function of the wealth or available collateral. Examples of those models are Evans and Jovanovic [9] , Hart and Moore [12] , Banerjee-Neumann [4] . Some of these models allow trade credit, i.e. funds that are backed by the goods supplied.
More recent studies are much more explicit on the way credit markets work and on the role of private information, contract enforcement and renegotiation in shaping up the form of contracts and access to lending. Moral hazard is the incentive problem that has received the most attention. If the bank takes too much of the project returns it might not be in the best interest of the borrower/entrepreneur to exert much effort or care. But, rational lenders would foresee the poor incentives of the borrower, which will imply that the lender restrict lending. [28] , firm and job creation and destruction by Monge [31] , etc. In the context of firm financing, the models by Hart and Moore [12] , Albuquerque and
Hopenhayn [1] , and Ligon, Thomas and Worrall [27] , the temptation to renege imposes limits to the credit. Because the temptation to repudiate and default is a direct function of the net worth of the firm, those models have explicit predictions on the links between firm's age and size with their growth, survival and profits, as well as the dividends distributed to owners.
Needless to say, these kinds of obstacles to the smooth operation of credit markets can make a difference in occupational choice, and therefore to the levels of activity of small firms, their success and their growth. The level of inequality, the overall rate of growth, and the level of employment are all functions of the nature of the credit markets. It easy to see that improvements in credit markets could have beneficial implications for growth, employment, and the distribution of income. (See for example Banernjee-Newman and [4] Lehnert [25] ) Furthermore, in a world where small firms are innovators, these limitations in the allocation of credit could severely impair the ability of the whole economy to adopt new technologies and economic activities.
All of the many different incentive problems emphasized by the theory may be of relevance in practice. With this agnostic attitude we will interpret the findings in this paper.
Bank Behavior and the Allocation of Credit in Costa Rica
Before revising the information on firm's behavior, it is convenient to review the results in Monge, Cascante and Hall [32] (hereafter, MCH) on bank practices in Costa Rica. In that work we study the interaction of the banks in all the stages of the lending relationship: analysis and approval criteria of loan applications, setting of contractual terms, control, follow-up and enforcement as well as the renegotiation in cases of default. These findings are from the point of view of the banking institutions.
The information was obtained from a very detailed questionnaire submitted in 1998 to a sample of intermediaries.
MCH found significant differences in the default rates of financial intermediaries. On one hand, the production activities in Costa Rica are very heterogeneous and the financial alternatives are also very 6 diverse. The variety of financial intermediaries is large 2 . Traditionally, public institutions had dominated the allocation of credit as part of the politico-economic model. But the waves of liberation of the 80s and 90s and the structural changes in the economy have given much more room to private banks and intermediaries, resulting in important changes in the composition of the population of financial intermediaries. Indeed, manufactures and services, the fastest growing sectors, have relied more on private financing. Public banks remain more specialized in agricultural sectors.
The equilibrium in the credit market equilibrium must determine which types of borrowers obtain credit from which type of lender. Such matching can be vitiated by adverse selection, explaining part of the differences in the performance of banks. Yet, the ultimate determinant of the differences must be found on the credit policies of intermediaries. Table 13 in the appendix shows the frequency of almost every conceivable control and screening actions taken by banks. Any of these actions can in principle yield useful information about the prospects of the project, the characteristics of the borrower and the collateral. The evidence is much opposed to the common view of banks as dormant lenders, the banks in the sample are very active. Visits to the firm, analysis of the project and the incentives and capacity of repayment of their customers are not uncommon. Obviously, the high frequency of these actions may be due to the regulation of the Superintendence of Banks and the reserves that banks must hold for different risks qualification for loans.
Banks pay a special attention to the collateral of the entrepreneur. The overwhelming majority of the banks make some assessment of the existence, type, market value and liquidity of the collateral.
Unsecured lending is almost non-existing. Moreover the reputation of the borrower is also a key element in evaluating an application. Monge et. al asked about the importance of a variety of criteria in deciding whether to grant the loan. Table 14 of the appendix reports the importance of those criteria to approve a loan. All elements related to the warranty put on the project and the solvency and references of the borrower play a critical role.
Monge et al. also find that banks look for information on the entrepreneur from alternative sources.
Indeed, the use of credit bureaus is widespread as indicated by Table 15 in the appendix. In showing the fraction of banks that use credit bureaus, the table indicates that banks in the Metropolitan area have a greater need for those references. Banks in rural areas have more first hand information on the creditors. The operational characteristics of these bureaus, some of which are shown in Table 16 of the appendix, is a clear indication of the level of sophistication of the information network available to lenders.
Undoubtedly, the findings of MCH support the relevance of a variety of incentive problems in the different stages of the bank-entrepreneur relationships. Banks devote resources to scrutinize the applications, to control the development of ongoing projects and to enforce the contract, even at the level of the courts. Our purpose in this paper is to complete the picture. Now, we surveyed a rather large set of firms and obtained information on their behavior and financing characteristics. But before, it is convenient to provide some background on the manufacturing sector in Costa Rica.
The Manufacturing Sector in Costa Rica
We selected the sector of manufactures because of various reasons. First, as already indicated, the importance of this sector has remained stable and indeed has increased lately. Second, disposable data on this sector is better than for the agriculture, services and commerce. Moreover, the sector is largely located in the Metropolitan Area. This is convenient as we could more easily obtain a representative sample with the limited resources available. Finally, banking credit to manufacturing firms is dominated by private institutions. This suggests that, if there are constraints to credit they are less likely to be led by political considerations. Working with this sector is also convenient as the results are more likely to be relevant for the future. Manufactures and private intermediaries are bound to increase their relative importance in Costa Rica. The manufacturing sector has a strong presence in the Costa Rican economy. During the 90s, as Table 1 shows it has averaged approximately 21% of the of GDP and 16% of the labor force. These shares have remain stable, but in the last two years they have increased partly due to the exporting firms. The importance of the manufacturing sector in the exports of Costa Rica is not only significant but has increased and it is expected to increase over time. This is true even excluding the firms with special tax treatments (Zonas Francas). Figure 4 shows that more than 70% have at most 10 employees. The distribution is skewed with very few very large firms. Moreover, as Figure 5 indicates, small firms are also important in terms of employment. Roughly speaking, firms with less than 10 employees account for 10% of the total manufacturing employment; those with at most 50 employees account for more than 30%. These figures are significantly higher than in developed economies, as already noted by Ulate [36] , Bolanos and Gutiérrez [7] and Yong [38] among others.
Available information on the financing of firms is fragmented and outdated. Most is for large firms registered in the National Stock Exchange or in the Electronic Exchange. Hence, we decided carry out our own survey that include both large and small firms, and that focuses on the different financing decisions. Such survey will be helpful in understanding the cross section of the firms in the last year.
The information will also be linked and compared with the information available that we now proceed to discuss.
Coyuntura Industrial (Industrial Conjuncture), a Section of the Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas at Universidad de Costa Rica, periodically surveys the manufacture sector since 1980. It produces a quarterly index of manufacturing activity. But, while these surveys are rich in terms of production, employment and other indicators, they fail to our purposes for two reasons. First, they do not look into financing conditions. Second, they include mostly larger firms. The most comparable study dates back to 1994, when the U.S. Agency for International Development and Academia de Centroamérica conducted a survey on the small business sector (commerce, industry and services).
They sampled 808 firms with less than 20 employees and monthly sales below US$ 13.000 per month.
The survey was centered on financial aspects of small firms, including their birth. The results, which are reported in V. Villalobos [37] , are very suggestive of the financing profile of small firms as well as the determinants of the access to formal credit. We compare below our results with those of Villalobos [37] . Their results clearly show a very limited access of small business to banking credit. Table 2 shows the source of funds for firm births. As clearly indicated, the role of formal credit is very low, less than 14% of the funds required to start up a firm. The lion's share of the funds originate from personal savings of the entrepreneur.
Villalobos reports that as much as one third of the entrepreneurs do not have access to formal credit at all. For those, the main source of credit is a supplier and/or the advanced payments of customers. But even those firms with banking credit, use banks infrequently and in low scale. Moreover, firms tend to use only one source of funds. Specifically, they find that 70% use only one provider of credit. Table 3 shows that formal credit is much lower than commercial credit and even lower than transfers and loans from friends and relatives. We will come back to this study, when we try to compare it to our findings.
Firm Survey and the Selection of the Sample
Our objective when designing the sample was to depict the financing profile of various types of firms.
For firms with 20 or more employees we built a representative sample of 150 firms from the universe of firms used by Coyuntura in the construction of the Index of Industrial Activity. We stratified the sample of these 'large' firms, according to the different sectors of the Index of Industrial Activity and the number of employees in the firm. We then randomly chose firms from each sector. For each firm, we selected two substitutes.
A similar sampling scheme was applied to smaller firms (less than 20 employees). We used as universe the set of manufacturing firms registered in the Social Security Fund (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) as of January 2001. The universe is composed of approximately 5000 firms and we extracted a representative sample of 500 firms. Each selected firm was assigned two substitutes, a step that proved very useful later on. The survey was limited to the Great Metropolitan Area, which comprises the main cities in the country (San José, Alajuela, Heredia and Cartago) and most of the industrial production in the country.
The survey contained different questions for large, medium and small firms. We made approximately 2900 calls, sent 500 faxes and more than 600 visits to firms. We made extensive use of the sample of substitutes since some of the first set of firms were closed by the time of the interview or their phone number was wrong. At the end, with large and small firms, we were able to collect 355 questionnaires. We had a low rate of response for the access to accounting statements since many firms considered of much confidentiality. This is the most stringent limitation in the information collected.
Our questionnaire was based on the questionnaires employed by Luis J. Hall et al. [10, 11] for the borrowers of two commercial banks in Costa Rica and the questionnaires used by Robert Townsend et al. [8, 15] for the financing options of minority groups in Chicago and in Thailand 3 .
The information collected can be classified into the following categories:
Business general description: We included the most basic information on the firms, such as type of activity, location, size of the firm (number of employees, total assets), age of the firm, type of ownership, employees, type of hiring, time of the current owner and tenure of the current administration.
Business Performance and Financial Conditions:
To investigate the effect of the access to credit with the performance of firms, we gathered information of production, sales, profits, investments, debt, net worth, total assets.
Human capital and related issues:
Because the characteristics of the manager and/or owner can affect both the access to credit and the efficiency of the firm, we collect indicators such as education, previous experience on related activities, ownership of other business, family composition, other businesses and occupations.
Previous Performance Previous performance, good or bad record on loans in the past, can determine whether agents would have access to credit or not. We asked the entrepreneurs about previous relationships with creditors.
Ongoing finance To identify the main forms of financing by different types of firms we recorded information on production, sales, size of investments, inventory holdings and other working capital, payroll as well as sources of finance, i.e. internal funds or external finance, including banks and other formal intermediaries, trade credit, type of relationship with lender, (frequency, types of services), suppliers, and informal credit including personal and family sources as well other social networks. One way to learn about whether credit constraints may be binding or not is to ask a battery of questions such as those in Bond, Townsend et al. [6, 15] . We included in the survey questions such as:
1. Would you invest a windfall in your business? 3 We are thankful to Rob Townsend for facilitating us with their survey for La Villita, in Chicago.
2. Would you be willing to risk all or some of your assets on a new business?
3. Would you be willing to swap part of your firm in exchange of a reduction in debt?
4. Would you like to change the maturity of your debt?
5. Would you like to change some of your trade credit for banking credit?
6. Do you maintain a long term relationship with a bank?
The idea of including these qualitative indicators is to extract information that would not be available even with ideal information on the financial statements of the firms. Here, investment a windfall in your business would indicate that there are some productive investments available to the entrepreneur. If he would invest, it means that at the very least the expected return on those investment is above the market interest rate. (One must acknowledge though, that the answer to this question may not be as sharp in an environment such as in Costa Rica, with a high spread between deposit and lending rates.) A similar purpose is carried by the second of the questions. Here, however, risk-aversion and not necessarily credit constraints could be the factor. Yet, with a complete-markets (Arrow-Debreu) economy as a benchmark, risk-aversion would not be an issue, as agents can fully insure; investment and consumption decision would be separated in those cases.
Anyway, the answers to this questions could be vitiated with issues of risk aversion due to the lack of insurance. Items 3 and 4 attempt to investigate if the composition of liabilities are directly affected by the lack of some markets or lack of access to them. A similar objective drives the item 5, specifically geared to banking credit.
Start up finance
As indicated above, we also want to investigate credit rationing in the entry (extensive) margin. Similar questions as above can be asked but applied to the date when the firm as activated or bought. We will collect information of the financing of the firm at the time of activation. As in Townsend et al. [6, 15] we will distinguish firms started from scratch from those acquired by the entrepreneur.
Shocks and Insurance
Finally, we included in the survey a battery of questions regarding the possibility of using credit to shield the firm in case of sudden needs of liquidity, business opportunities and other shocks.
Financing Profiles
Perhaps the first thing one notices by looking at Tables 4-7 is that banks do not provide the majority of credit. Indeed, their participation in financing start up of firms is very scant. Capital for the industrial sector is mostly obtained from entrepreneur's own funds. Firms with larger value or larger employment exhibit a larger co-participation of partners. Both sources of funds add roughly to 75% of total initial needs. Firms financing of their initial activities with banking credit is only 14% of total startup capital.
In contrast banks provide 48% of total debt of ongoing firms. Notice that while banking remains the single most important source, trade and informal credit jointly outdo banks. These two sources account for 42% and 10% respectively, of the average credit of ongoing firms. The pattern holds with some variation to other firms. Older firms as well as larger value and larger employment firms finance their activities with a larger portion of private banking credit and a lower participation of trade credit and informal credit than their counterparts.
In the Tables we report simple averages of the debt composition over the total number of firms.
Moreover, we grouped the firms according to three different characteristics; age, number of employees and the reported value of the firm. According to age, firms are classified as young, mature and old as the firm´s age varies between 0 to 10 years, 11 to 25 years and more than 25 years respectively. For employment, we grouped firms with less than 10 employees, 10 to 20 employees and more than 20
employees. Finally, for value we took 50 millions of colones as the breaking point (approx. US$ 1,67 millions). Slight variations of the cutting points did not affect the numbers in a significant way. Tables 5 and 7 present the number of firms that had employed at least once this source of funding.
Then, ratios are computed dividing the number of firms that use at least once this source of fund by the number of firms reporting have employed funding. When grouping the firms by age, number of employees and value of the firm, we divided by the number of firms within each group. These two tables report only on the extensive margin of the financing. It is interesting that a similar picture arise if we look at the percentages of debts with the fractions of firms using each type of source.
Startup Capital
In general, older firms as well as larger value and employment firms present a different strategy to finance their startup capital which combines not only entrepreneur's own sources (33%) but also partners resources (38%). In contrast, their counterparts, i.e. younger firms as well as low value and low employment units center their funding in entrepreneur own resources (50%) and partners funds are only used in (22%) of the cases. Banking credit in the initial development of the firm means only 14% of total startup capital and there is not a major difference between firms when we group them by age, employment or value. A minor difference is observed when we consider Cooperativas which is a type of special Banking firm in Costa Rica specialized in individuals. Smaller and medium size firms use 5% and 8% this source respectively contrasted with 2% for larger firms.
Ongoing Finance
Firms finance their ongoing activities primarily with banks and suppliers. The banking sector represents on average 48% of the total ongoing finance of the firms while suppliers 42%. The informal sector finance 10% of total resources. When we decompose the sample by the age of the firm, number of employees and value of the firm, some important points deserve to be mentioned. In particular, the role of private banking credit increases considerably as we move to firms older, firms with larger number of employees and firms with larger value. Moreover, larger value firms and larger number of employees firms use less trade credit than their counterparts as well as less informal credit.
Let us consider these general findings in some detail. For the distinction by age, we have that as firms grow older they increase their use of the banking sector and reduce the informal financing. In particular, the use of private banking increases from 7% up to a 25% when firms move from Youth to
Old age. The informal sector reduces from 16% up to 3%. For the case of trade credit, we observe an u-shaped curve as the age of the firm increases. Youth and Old firms have a larger participation of trade credit in total financing than mature firms. Consider now the number of employees. As the number of employees increase, firms financing their activities by means of banking credit tend to be higher. This result is specially strong for the case of private banking credit which moves from 4% to 33%.
In contrast, the informal and trade credit are less used as the number of employees increase. For instance, the informal sector average 17% in small firms while it is only 3% in large ones. Trade credit reduces from 49% to 30% as the number of employees increase. Finally, for the case of the value of firms, we observe that as the value of firms rises private banking credit is more utilized than trade credit. The private banking credit sector finances 3% of the activities of firms with low value, while it finances 22% for larger valued firms. The same values are 52% and 33% for the case of trade credit.
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Determinants of the Access to Banking Credit
As shown in the previous section, access to formal banking credit is far from widespread. The evidence that we collected is only for the manufactures sector, but we strongly believe that the results apply in general. Indeed, our results indicate that things have not changed dramatically since the study by Villalobos [37] . As discussed above, the lack of formal banking credit is not only in terms of the intensity of use, as many firms do not use banking credit at all. It seems interesting -and potentially important-to treat the intensive and extensive margins explicitly. In this section we use simple and well-known econometric tools that allow doing that.
If we aimed to only examine whether a firm receives credit at all, we should contend ourselves with dichotomic, Probit models. Here, firms are classified in two groups: those with some banking credit and those with no banking credit at all. Then we estimate the probability that a firm belongs to either group as a function of the observable characteristics. As it is, a Probit model does not make use of all the information available, as it neglects the intensity of use of credit for firms with banking credit. To include that information, we can use a Tobit model. The intensity of use will be measured by the fraction of banking credit with respect to total credit.
To be more specific, let y i indicate the fraction of debt of firm debt i that is owed to banks; let y i be an indicator variable of whether the firm has formal banking credit at all (i.e. The variables x i in this study contain information on the firm (age, assets, employment, type of ownership, total debt, etc) including their industrial sector, as well as the characteristics of the owner or manager (age, sex, education, ownership of a house, previous experience, etc) as well as their response about whether they would like to change their financing profile. Table 8 defines the variables names used below. We will report first the results for the finances of ongoing firms. In the last part of this section, we report the results for the finances of the firms at the time of their activation. 
Results for Banking Credit in Ongoing Finances
We experimented with many different combinations of the variables obtained in the survey. Here we will only report the subset of the results that we find most interesting. 4 Our purpose was to find out if any of the characteristics of the firm and of the entrepreneur can explain the use of banking credit.
Firm's characteristics that are included are firm's age, size (log-of number of employees) and leverage (total debt/assets). Entrepreneur's indicators are his/her age, whether they have other sources of income, owned a house, had previous experience as entrepreneur and the fraction of the firm initially financed by banks.
We report estimates for specifications that focus exclusively on the characteristics of the firm, on the characteristics of the entrepreneur and specifications that include both. Specifically, we estimate the following four models: Model 1 includes almost all the information, i.e. characteristics of entrepreneur and of the firm. Model 2 excludes from Model 1, the size of the firm and its leverage. The idea is that these variables could be better seen as the outcome and not a factor behind the access to credit. Model 3 focuses on the characteristics of the entrepreneur. Thus, it excludes firm's characteristics. Finally, Model 4 focuses on characteristics of the firm. Here we also included the value of the firm as a explanatory variable. While the (self-assessed) value of the firm can also be seen as being affected by credit constraints, we included this variable here because we wanted to investigate if its inclusion in the regression would affect the result for the other variables, including its value. Tables 9 and 10 show, respectively the results for the Probit and the Tobit models. In these tables, as well as the subsequent ones, there are two rows for each variable. The first one contains the estimated coefficient while the second raw contains the t-statistics under the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. In all the estimations we included dummies for the industrial sector of the firm.
These dummies are not statistically significant and because we are not directly interested in inter-sector differences per se and to keep tables with a manageable size, they will not be included in the tables. As can be seen in both tables, in all four specifications, personal characteristics of entrepreneurs do not appear to have a significant effect on either, the probability of having banking credit or the fraction of credit that comes from banks. In all cases, it seems that the age of the entrepreneur has a negative effect, but it is never significant. Consistent with the view that women may have harder times obtaining credit, the estimates on the sex dummy frequently show a negative sign, but it also is never statistically significant either. A similar result is obtained for the ownership of a house; the sign is positive but not significant. Potentially more interestingly is that, with the exception of one regression, the percentage of initial capital from banking credit shows a negative relationship with the participation of banks in the current credit of firms. This may appear odd, as firms that were funded by banks in the first place, would be more likely to keep an ongoing relationship with banks. Notice that we are directly including a dummy variable that indicates whether the entrepreneur considers that he or she has an ongoing relationship with banks. However, the negative point estimates remain even if we do not include that dummy.
With respect to other income, it is
Anyhow, the results are never statistically significant.
Characteristics of the firms are more significant. In Tables 9 and 10 we only report the results for the models discussed above. However, we estimated many different variations. The main problem in extracting conclusions from these regressions is the high degree of co-linearity between firms characteristics such as age, number of employees, value, etc. All these variable tend to move in the same direction.
Estimating the Probit and Tobit models, respectively with the probability of banking credit and its fraction over total credit, using only size (number of employees), value or age, as the only explanatory variable, always render positive and statistically significant estimates. With the exception of firm's age, those results, which are not shown here, are robust to the inclusion to the entrepreneur's characteristics.
The problem arises when we include several of these characteristics at the same time.
The value of the firm is the most robust predictor of the firm's access to banking credit. Regardless of which of the other variables are included, the estimated effect value of the firm remains positive and statistically significant. On the other hand, as long as the value of the firm is not included, both, the size of the firm in terms of the (log of) number of employees and the dummy of formal accounting procedures, have a positive and significant effect. Including the value of the firm eliminates both results, an indication that the value of the firm embeds the same information.
In model 4 we included the leverage because we want to control for the total debt of the firm, and we
want to study what determines the fraction of it that is financed by formal financial intermediaries. The expected sign in all equations is positive, as firms that need more credit would try harder to obtain it from cheaper sources. The point estimates are positive in both, the Probit and Tobit models, but interestingly, they are much more significant in the Probit model. These results suggest that firms either, firms in large need of credit will make extra efforts in obtaining it from banks. Alternatively, we could point to the other direction of causality. Firms with access to banks will make more intense use of credit. With the data available it is impossible to attempt to distinguish which direction of causality is the most relevant.
A word of warning is in order. As indicated already, "characteristics" such as number of employees, value, having formal accounting procedures and even type of ownership are all outcomes of the past, current and expected future behavior and performance of the firm, and, obviously, these cannot be assumed to be independent of the access to credit. Yet, in any point in time, those characteristics must determine the access to banking credit in the period. If we had panel data one would and should attempt different identification schemes to estimate the direct effect of those firm's outcome characteristics on their access to banking credit. The main limitation that we faced in this project in Costa Rica is precisely the lack of panel data on firms.
Start-Up Finances
It is widely believed that credit constraints are more stringent for younger firms than for older and better established ones. If that is the case, then credit limitations should be the most stringent precisely at entry, i.e. when an entrepreneur starts a new business. Indeed, in the previous section we found that banking credit is a significantly more important source of resources for established firms than for newly created ones. In this sense, our evidence is consistent with the view that banking credit is harder to obtain for new firms. As we did in the previous subsection, now we want to investigate which characteristics of the firms and of the entrepreneurs explain their access to banks. We wish to recognize up front the inherent limitations of using retrospective data. The ideal would be to collect information on firms just entering at the time of the survey. Yet, a good registry of new firms is not available, and moreover, the small size of the country will likely limit the applicability of statistical methods. As with ongoing finances, we use Probit and Tobit models to estimate the participation on banking credit as a function of observable characteristics. Table 11 shows some of the results obtained. We tried many different specifications, involving most of the recorded characteristics of entrepreneurs and firms. Contrary to what we were expecting, the variables on the schooling attainment of the owner were never significant, and moreover, they tended to change signs depending on the other regressors included. Because of that, we did not feel comfortable reporting any estimates on the owner's education. Moreover, they did not affect the significance of the other variables. Other characteristics of the owner such as whether he or she had a house or the gender were not significant, but the sign of the estimate remained mostly unchanged with the different sets of regressors. Indeed, while not significant, having a house is positively associated with obtaining banking credit. Also, women appear to have more difficulties in obtaining credit. The direction of these results is as expected, but again, the estimates are not statistically significant. The table also shows that in the case of start-up financing, the sector of the firm can significantly affect the access to banking credit. This is contrary to the case case of ongoing finance, partly because there we included more characteristics of the firm.
The most robust finding is that there is a negative and significant relationship between the use of banking credit and whether the owner had previous experience as entrepreneur at the time of starting the firm. To some extent this is surprising. One would expect that entrepreneurs with previous experience may have accumulated useful skills and knowledge to successfully manage the new firm.
As such creditors should be more willing to lend resources, and one should have a positive estimate on the previous experience. A negative, significant effect can be explained by very different reasons, which we cannot distinguish with the data set collected. One possibility is that previous experience is indicating failures in the past. As such, the bad record as entrepreneur could convey negative information (a stigma) from the point of view of the bankers. An alternative explanation is that banking credit is hard to obtain for young firms but for reasons completely independent of the previous experience (failures or successes) of the firm. A negative sign could be explained if previous experience denotes previous successes that allowed the entrepreneur to accumulate the resources necessary for the new firm. Those entrepreneurs would be self-financing their projects, dispensing the need for banks. A third alternative is that entrepreneurs with previous experience can find it easier to obtain credit from other members in the sector. All these hypothesis remain possible, as we cannot discern among them with the data available.
Credit Constraints and Firm Performance
What is the effect of having access to formal banking credit on the behavior and performance of firms?
In general, banking credit is less expensive than other forms such as trade and informal credit. Thus, having access to banking credit will affect firms in a variety of margins, ranging from their profits (and hence their net value) as well as their size and investment decisions. Moreover, credit market frictions also affect the creation, liquidation and growth of the population of firms in the economy (see for example, Albuquerque-Hopenhayn [1] and Monge [31] ), and thus, better access to credit implies that more small firms would be created and less will be destroyed. Firms with better access to credit will grow faster and therefore, if active, firms would be larger. Then, in equilibrium, the extent that firms have access to banking credit would enhance the mass of active firms but the implications on the shape of the cross-section distribution of active is not easy to determine.
A controlled experiment would provide the ideal method to assess the effect of having access to formal credit markets. Imagine one could put two large groups of individuals, identical in all respects except for the access to formal credit markets. If we could follow the two groups over time, then we could record and compare the size, growth, profits, investment, as well as entry (firm activation decisions), exit (firm liquidation) and life-span of firms. Under such an ideal scenario, one could unambiguously assess the effect of having access to formal markets in all these dimensions of firm behavior, and one could even make strong welfare conclusions.
Of course, such experiments are not available. Yet, thinking of such hypothetical exercises helps us situate the limitations and visualize the potential biases of estimations using actual data. First of all, the disposable data is only on active firms. Indeed, credit constrained firms are more likely to liquidate early, and they might not be created at all simply because of the lack of good credit alternatives. Thus credit constrained firms may not be observed at all at the time of collecting the sample. One can barely think of a tougher problem than that of envisaging the cross section of firms would look like had the financial markets be different!! A more limited objective would be to study the effect of credit constraints on the behavior of surviving firms. If we could follow a set of firms that have access to different credit markets. In this case, omitting survival biases, one would be able to contrast the behavior of investment, and other measures of firm's behavior. The main challenge in this case would be to identify variables that determine the access to formal banking credit and do not affect the performance of the firm directly.
Schiantarelli [34] discusses panel GMM methods to handle this problem specifically. Unfortunately, the aforementioned lack of available panel data in Costa Rica impedes us to adopt these methods.
With the cross-section data collected in our survey, in this section we explore two different econometric methods to attempt isolating the effects of credit constraints on the behavior and performance of firms. Specifically, we want to assess the effect of that having access to bank credit.
The econometric problem we have to face is that sample selection problems: the firms with and without access may be inherently different, and measures of their behavior and performance may determine the extent to which firms have credit.
As made clear by the dynamic limited enforcement models of Albuquerque and Hopenhayn [1] , Hart and Moore [12] and Monge [31] , the characteristics of firms in any point in time are the result of their previous behavior and access to credit. Those models also imply that the value and (observable) productivity and profits of a firm determine explicitly the credit that they can obtain. Thus, anyone interested in estimating the effect of credit constraints on dimensions of firm's behavior, must necessarily face the identification problem of controlling for the effect of those observable characteristics on the credit received. The following subsection discusses a methodology that imposes functional and distributional form assumptions to explicitly handle the identification problem.
Effect of Banking Credit I: A Two Step Parametric Method
The most natural way to assess the effects of having access to banking credit would be to run a simple regression of the form:
where p i denotes alternative measures of interest on the performance of firm i; y i denotes whether the firm i has banking credit or not and X i observable characteristics of the same firm. Here ε i indicates random, unobserved heterogeneity.
While intuitive, such approach will not necessarily render consistent estimates of γ, the effect of access on the performance on the firm. At the very least, one must recognize that one does not observe a purely random sample of (p i ,y i ,X i ). To see that, imagine that we have a set of firms with the same characteristics X i and randomly we allow some firms to have credit (y i ,=1) and others without it (y i ,=0). Under these circumstances, one could consistently estimate the effect of the credit by the difference in the estimated means of the performances. Now, if we have firms with different characteristics X i , as long as the sampling is random, OLS will consistently estimate the effect of credit. The problem, is that having access to banking credit is indeed the result of a market equilibrium, and, as such, it is quite possible that a set of variables affect both, firm performance and access to credit. Using the previous equation, the problem is that whether a firm has credit may depend on (X i ε i ).
Clearly, the key problem is that we do not observe the counterfactual performance that firms that received credit would have had with no access. Also, we do not observe the performance that firms with no credit would have had if they had access to it. This problem could be solved if we could estimate such counterfactual.
This sample selectivity problem is well known in the economics literature. In this subsection, we adopt a strategy to developed originally by labor economists, mostly by James Heckman [13, 14] . 
where φ and Φ are, respectively, the pdf and cdf functions of a standard normal. The last line follows from the normality assumption. A similar expression can be obtained for E [pi|Xi, yi=0] .
Thus, if we knew the value of the parameter α we could simply add the term
in the right hand side of the equation. In this way, we would obtain consistent estimates of (γ,β). The problem is that we do not know the exact value of α. This discussion suggests a method to estimate the model, precisely because one can consistently estimate α, by simply estimating a Probit. (Which, again, is warranted, given the normality assumption). This is precisely what the methods advocated by Heckman and others do. First, estimate α via maximum likehood on a probit. Second, obtain the values for λ i , i.e. the inverse Mill's ratios (φ/Φ) for each firm each type, firms with and without formal banking credit. Third, using the observations on all firms, estimate the performance equation 5 .
Results
We apply the previous methods to estimate the effect of banking credit on several measures of performance. Here we want to emphasize that separating exogenous characteristics and measures of behavior and performance is necessarily an arbitrary exercise. All observable characteristics recorded for each firm is derived from its history.
Anyway, we concentrate on the effect of banking credit on the following measures of behavior and performance:
• Log of Employment.
• Profit Rate as a fraction of initial net assets.
• Total Investment 6
• Investment as a fraction of net earnings.
As exogenous characteristics, in these exercises we will take
• Firm indicators: age, accounting system, type of ownership.
• Entrepreneur's indicators: age, sex, etc.
• Dummy variables to control for different sectors.
In all cases we included indicators of the characteristics of the owner and whether the firm is managed by the owner or by someone else. In the results reported here we did not include leverage, as it could be highly correlated with access to banking credit. The results did not change dramatically if leverage is included. We did not include the value of the firm in neither, the performance equation or the probability equation.
Sector dummies are not statistically significant at conventional levels and their exclusion from the equations did not change the main results. Table 12 reports the results of the regressions including sector dummies, but the estimates for those are not included to keep the size of the table small. Regardless of the specific measure of behavior/performance, to carry out these exercises one must impose assumptions on which variables belong to both the access equation and the performance/behavior equation. Specifically, we need to impose that some variables affect only the performance and not the probability of accessing credit. We explored many different specifications, some of which were reported in previous versions of the paper.
The results reported here are for the case in which we specify the probability of having access to banking credit only as a function of the (log of) age of the firm and whether the firm has formal accounting or not 7 . In the previous section we found that having financial statements and the value of the firm are the better predictor of access to credit. In the current exercises we used the age of the firm instead of the value of the firm because endogeneity problems are more severe with firm's value than with firm's age. We then specified the performance of the firms to be functions of the age of the firm and whether it has financial statements or not as well as other characteristics, such as type of ownership, sex and age of the manager. As explained above, we can estimate the effect of banking credit by including the dummy variable bancred and the estimates are consistent as long as we include the estimated Mill's ratio from the probability equation.
Under these assumptions, the model is identified. While the identification assumptions are in principle ad-hoc, it is important to notice that similar results were obtained under a wide variety of alternative identification assumptions. Table 12 shows the results for all four measures of performance.
The table shows that for the most part the characteristics of the firms do not affect the performance of the firms. The same applies for the sector dummies (not reported here). In the versions that included the total leverage of the firm, this variable had in general a significant positive effect on the performance of firms. In the versions in which we included the variable uselott in the performance equation, that variable was also a significant predictor of the reinvestment rate, but not of the other performance measures.
Our results suggest that access to banking credit has a positive effect on performance. In all cases, the estimate on bancred has a positive sign and are large (keep in mind that we have logged the employment). Unfortunately, the results are not statistically significant. For instance, the point estimates indicate that just having access to bank credit would increase the (natural) log of employment by 2.28, almost 10 more employees in each firm. The implied size of the effects on total investment, profit rate and reinvestment rate are so large that they can not be taken seriously. But they signal that if statistically significant, the effects are large. 7 In the previous version of the paper we reported the results of the exercises including qualitative indicators such as the willingness to exchange assets for debt (Exastdbt), whether would use a lottery rainfall in the firm (uselott) and Exsupdbt (whether the entrepreneur would want to exchange suppliers/trade credit for banking credit) affecting the probability of receiving banking credit. We also excluded the leverage but in the performance equation not in the probability equation, because it has so much predictive power in the probits that it would cause singularities in the performance equation. The qualitative results in terms of signs, magnitude and significance of the estimates on bancred and sample selection are the same as the ones discussed in the current versión of the paper.
However, the t-statistics are low. In general, the values are around one not significant at any relevant significance level. With out data we cannot reach strong conclusions, but the results are highly suggestive.
In terms of whether selection issues are important. In all cases, the correction for selection provides a negative estimate for the coefficient on λ. Once we directly include bancred on the performance equation, the fact that the firm is likely to have access or not to bank's credit does not enhance its performance. Indeed, the estimated effect goes in the opposite direction. However, notice that in no case the results are significant.
It turns out that the results reported in Table 12 are very robust to changes in the variables included in both regression. This is not surprising, as we already indicated that the RHS variables are rarely significant. We experimented with eliminating some of the variables or including indicators of human capital of the owner, previous experience, credit indicators at the time of the start-up of the business.
The sign for bancred and lambda remained positive and negative. While in very few cases the coefficients turned out to be significant from zero for some of the performance measures, those cases were easy to overturn by small changes in the set of regressors 8 .
To summarize, our results timidly suggest that having access to credit constraints can have large effects on the size (employment), investment and profits of firms. However, even imposing the strong functional form assumptions inherent of the method, the data does not provide enough information to statistically reject the alternative hypothesis of no effects at all, at least at the significance levels traditionally used.
Effect of Banking Credit II: Non-Parametric Bounds
As stressed above, the previous methods hinge heavily on functional and distributional form assumptions. Those methods are parsimonious and commonly used. There is no doubt that they are an essential exercise to investigate the effect of credit constraints. It is important to emphasize that in our particular application we are not deriving the equations from any economic structural model, and therefore, our estimates are simple reduced form effects, not directly interpretable parameters. As such, functional forms and distributional assumptions are not fundamentals of the problem, but just additional assumptions imposed to solve it. In this section we explore a set of methods that dispense completely of functional and distributional form assumptions. Imposing less structure increase the 8 As with the data set, the LIMDEP codes used for these regressions are available from the authors upon request.
robustness of the conclusions, but this comes at the price of necessarily reducing the sharpness of the possible conclusions.
In this section we adopt the general methods developed mostly by Manski and Horowitz [29, 30] to analyze the response to treatments. As before, we envisage the access to banking credit as a "treatment", and explicitly recognize that there is a selection bias problem as the characteristics of firms endogenously determine whether they have access to credit from banks or not. Because these methods
are not yet part of the folklore of economic tools, we explain them in some detail.
Specifically, consider a population of J firms. Each firm j∈J has observable characteristics x j , and will have an performance/behavior y j (t). That performance/behavior can occur in two mutually exclusive cases: the firm has no access to banking credit t=0 or, t=1, the firm has access to banking credit. Firm j has a realized access to credit z j ∈{0,1} and a realized outcome y j . As before, the selection problem arises because the latent outcomes y j (t), t≠z j , are not observable, i.e. the econometrician does not observe the (counterfactual) performance that firms that received credit would have had if they didn't have access as well as the performance that firms that did not receive credit would have had if they had.
From a random sample of the population of firms, a researcher can learn the empirical distribution P(x, z, y) of covariates, realized performance/behavior measures, and realized access to banks. The researcher's problem is to combine this empirical evidence with (identification) assumptions in order to learn about the distribution of response functions. In particular, we are interested to learn the average effect of access to banking credit,
We will report results from using three different methods developed by Manski and Horowitz, and that are routinely used in this literature: Worst-case bounds, Exogenous Selection and Instrumental
Variables Bounds. The methods look to extract the most robust conclusions from the data, in the sense that look for the worst and best case scenarios for the effects of the treatment (access to banking credit).
Thus, if we can establish that the access of banking credit has a positive effect in the worst case scenario, then, the data available will strongly indicate that it has a positive effect on firm performance.
All the methods are based on non-parametric estimation of probability functions. Thus, they are free of functional form assumptions.
Worst-Case Bounds
This procedure estimates the worst-case bounds. The outcome variable is assumed bounded, and normalized so that the lowest value is y=0 and the highest is y=1. Let y a vector with the performance data; z the vector of binary variables indicating whether the firms have access to credit or not. Also, let
x be data on covariates, observable characteristics of firms.
This method computes for each treatment t∈{0,1}, the worst-case bounds on E[y (1) |x] and
Combining these equations, the resulting upper and lower bounds on the average treatment
While the average, or point estimate effect on the treatment cannot be estimated from the data, both lower and upper bounds can be estimated. Here, if the observable characteristics x contain a continuous variable the method uses kernel estimation of P(⋅|⋅) and E [⋅|⋅] . In case all x are discrete, they are computed using cell averages.
Estimates Assuming Exogenous Treatment Selection
A different set of bounds can be estimated if are willing to impose additional identification assumptions. One set of assumptions commonly used (implicitly or explicitly) is to assume that the selection of firms according to z=1 or z=0 is an exogenous process. In particular, this assumption takes the form in our application of the condition that the selection of firms in terms of their access to credit amounts to:
This assumption, which is non-testeable, is equivalent as assuming that the sample comes from a randomized experiment. Under this assumption, the effect of having access to credit is
As before, if the observable characteristics x contain a continuous variable the method uses kernel estimation of P(⋅|⋅) and E [⋅|⋅] . In case all x are discrete, they are computed using cell averages.
Instrumental Variable (IV) Bounds
Sharper bounds could be obtained if we go further in terms of identification assumptions. One possibility, which is widely used in other econometric exercises, is to assume that there is a set of (instrumental) variables that can be used to sharpen the estimation of the bounds. For the exercises in terms of non-parametric bounds, the procedure here was developed in Manski and Horowitz [29, 30] .
Specifically, let v be instrumental variable (IV) data, and w the covariates not used as instruments. And, as before, if the observable characteristics x contain a continuous variable the method uses kernel estimation of P(⋅|⋅) and E [⋅|⋅] . In case all x are discrete, they are computed using cell averages.
Results: Bounds on the Effects on Banking Credit
In terms of firm behavior and performance, we will apply these methods to the performance/behavior measures used before: Employment (Number of Employees), reinvestment rate, profit rate, firm's value. We decided to leave aside total investment. The reason is that to assess the effect of total investment we must necessarily control for firm's size (assets or employment). Yet, we believe that the sample size is not large enough to allow a reliable use of no parametric methods with the rich structure of covariation across independent variables.
The methods allows us to investigate the effect of having access to banking credit on different classes of firms. A first dimension we will explore is the age of firms. Thus, we attempt to capture the effect of credit constraints on firms in different stages of their life cycle. A second part, is that we want to distinguish firms with different organization and management. We believe that, given the available information, the most relevant variable to separate firms along these lines is using Ftypown, i.e.
whether the firm Unfortunately, our sample is not long enough for us to reliably estimate the joint distribution function of the firm age, type of management, and access to bank credit. The key problem is that the age of a firm is a continuous variable, and kernel estimators, to be reliable, need large numbers of firms for each different ages. To circumvent this problem we decided instead to classify firms in deciles of age. Then, estimate the probabilities for each cell of firms represented each of the deciles. With this, we avoid uninteresting large sensitivities on the observations of the characteristics of one or two firms in ranges whether few firms are observed in the sample. Using quintiles instead of deciles did not significantly change the results.
Based on our results on the Heckman's two step estimators, we will use uselott as instrument for estimating IV bounds. In general, this instrument sharpens the bounds just slightly. It is certainly not enough to yield point estimation and moreover, it cannot rule out zero or negative values as a possibility. Similar results were obtained using other variables as instruments. With worst and best case bounds, there is always the possibility that the effect of having access to banks is zero, as the interval defined by the bounds include zero in general. This is general a problem with this methodology. When so little restrictions are imposed, most datasets fail rule out the possibility that the average performance under the two alternatives (here bank credit or no bank credit)
to be the same. However, one advantage of these methods is that it explicitly describes the entire set of possibilities allowed by the data for the effects. In this sense, it is interesting that worst case bound is closer to zero for younger firms than for older firms. Therefore, this method suggests --without implicating-that banking credit is more likely to benefit younger firms than older ones.
Interestingly, using instruments such as uselott does not greatly sharpens the bounds but suffices to move their range to exclude zero. Indeed, with the IV-bounds, zero is sometimes outside the admissible range for younger firms managed by their owner. These facts help supporting our view that the banking credit is more likely to have positive effects on the performance/behavior of firms at younger ages. A very important point is that in general, the bounds allow the possibility of very large, effects of banking credit on the performance/behavior of firms. While in the worst-case scenario we cannot rule out that the effect of having access to banking credit is negligible or even negative, the bounds indicate that the effects can potentially be huge.
These methods do not provide a direct way to obtain a point estimate. One possibility is to take the average between the worst and the best case bounds, or between the upper and lower bounds of the IV estimator. But, such a selection criterion does not have an explicit, conceptually sound, basis. If one is willing to accept exogenous selection as an identification assumption, one could directly compute a point estimate for the effect of banking credit. Those estimates are reported in the lower panels for each of the performance/behavior measures. As can be seen, in general the point estimates are positive, and indeed, very large, for all age groups and management types. They appear larger for older firms.
However, one must be aware that as we increase measured firm age, out sample includes smaller fractions of firms with own-management and not banking credit. This mere fact reduces the reliability of the estimated effects, not only for the point estimates with exogenous selection but also for worst/best case bounds and IV-bounds. Bounds seem more symmetric for the last age-decile. Thus, the data is rather uninformative for that last age group. Recognizing this limitation of the dataset, we wish to emphasize that the results are more robust for younger firms.
Conclusions
In this paper we examined the finances of firms in Costa Rica, investigated the variables that explained the access to formal banking credit and explored the effect of credit limitations on the behavior and performance of firms. With those objectives, we set out to directly collect information on firms of different size in a variety of manufacture sectors in the Metropolitan Area in Costa Rica. Given the lack of good data sources in Costa Rica, the first contribution of this investigation is precisely, the data collected. Using a variety of econometric technique, we believe, however, that the paper provides interesting results.
First of all, the access to banking credit is very far from widespread. Indeed, consistent with older studies, Costa Rican firms still depend to a large extent to informal credit and trade credit to finances their operations. We showed that the differences are not only in terms of intensity, as many firms do not obtain banking credit at all. We provided strong evidence that smaller and younger firms have significantly less banking credit than older, larger firms. The small importance of banking credit is more vividly observed for entering firms. In our data, we found that a large share of the funds come from own savings, relative transfers and informal credit.
We also explored what factors drive the access to banking credit. Here, using simple econometric methods we found that the probability of having banking credit and the fraction of banking credit with respect to total debt are mostly affected by firm's characteristics, not entrepreneur's characteristics. The main determinants seem to be the firm's value, size in terms of the number of employees, age and whether it keeps formal accounting procedures. A serious limitation of this part of the study is that those firm's characteristics are the outcome of previous, current and future behavior and performance, which, in principle, are affected by the accessibility to credit itself. We do not possess the longitudinal data needed for identifying the direct effect of those. We wish to call the attention of research centers in Costa Rica for the importance of setting up a longitudinal survey on the production and financing decisions of small and large firms.
We were expecting that personal characteristics such as the education and age of the entrepreneur would be key factors behind the access to credit. Surprisingly, the data does single out characteristics of the entrepreneur explaining access to credit for ongoing firms nor at the time of starting up the firm. Interestingly, we find that previous experience as entrepreneur has a negative and significant effect on the participation of banks in the financing of new firms. This finding is compatible with very different hypothesis, all of them highlighting the importance of credit constraints for new firms. A similar result, but without statistical significance, holds for entrepreneurs with other sources. Again, it would be very useful to dispose of longitudinal data to discern between these alternative hypotheses.
Finally, adopting ideas from the econometric literature on treatment effects, we reported results from two methods to correct for selection biases: a parametric two-step point method and a non-parametric method that estimates upper and lower bounds for the effect of having access to bank credit. The two methods are very different, and both failed to render sharp or statistically conclusive results. But, both methods pointed in the direction that having access to banking credit can have large effects on the behavior of firms, increasing their size, investment, and profits. But, once again, we believe the results can be much more conclusive had we have better data. 
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